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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO GO TO THE JURY UPON MOTION
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BY ALL PARTIES
Section 270.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides:
"Whenever in a jury trial all the parties, without reserva-
tion, move the court to direct a verdict, such motions, unless
otherwise directed by the court before discharge of the jury,
constitute a stipulation waiving a jury trial and submitting the
entire case to the court for decision"."
This statute re-establishes in this state the common law rule which
was rejected by our Supreme Court in the case of Hite vs. Keene,
the court saying:
"This court has never adopted the rule that a motion for a
directed verdict by both parties is equivalent to a stipulation
that all the issues therein be disposed of by the court and has
no disposition to do so now".a
The common law rule also prevailed in the Federal Courts prior
to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Proceedure by the Supreme Court
in 1938. The rule there was that where plaintiff and defendant re-
spectively requested peremtory instructions, they thereby assumed the
facts to be undisputed and in effect submitted to the trial judge the
determination of the inferences properly to be drawn from them,3
unless they reserved their right to go to a jury, if the court should
regard the facts as disputed. Where such reservation was properly
made the court could not ignore it and assume to find the facts from
the evidence as though the case had been unconditionally submitted."
The two leading cases in the Federal Courts are the Beutell case 5
and the Santa Fe case.6 Mr. Justice White stated in the former case:
"As... both parties asked the court to instruct a verdict both
affirmed that there was no disputed question of fact which
could operate to deflect or control the question of law. This
was necessarily a request that the court find the facts, and the
parties are therefore concluded by the finding made by the court,
'Wis. Stat., 1945 Sec. 270.26; Court Rules, 245 Wis. viii (1944).
2 Hite v. Keene, 149 Wis. 207; 134 N.W. 383 (1912).
a Beutell v. Magone (1895) 157 U.S. 154, 15 Sup. Ct.. Rep. 566, 39 L.Ed. 654;
Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat. Bank and Trust Co., (1937), 301 U.S. 206, 57
S.Ct. 719, 81 L.Ed. 1042. Swift and Co. v. Columbia Ry., Gas and Electric Co.,
C.C.A.S.C.(1927), 17 F. 2nd 46 Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, D.C.
Colo. (1912), 207 F. 419. Fed. Life Ins.. Co. v. Rumpel, C.C.A. Mich. (1939),
102 F. 2nd 120. See also Blackburn Const. Co. v. Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank,
C.C.A. OkI. (1930), 37 F 2nd 865, certiorari denied 281 U.S. 755, 50 S. Ct.
409, 74 L. Ed. 1165.
4 Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., (1907)
210 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 607. Sampliner v. Motion Picture Patents Co. (1920) 254
U.S. 233, 41 S. Ct. 79, 65 L.Ed. 240.
5 Beutell v. Magone (1895) 157 U.S. 154, 15 S.Ct. 567, 39 L.Ed. 654.
6 Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1907)
210 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 607.
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upon which the resulting instruction of law was given. The
facts having been thus submitted to the court, we are limited
in reviewing its action, to the consideration of the correctness
of the finding on the law, and must affirm if there be any evi-
dence in support thereof".7
In the Sante Fe case Mr. Justice White clarified and modified the
Beutell case by saying:
"It was settled in Beutell vs Magone ... that where both
parties requested a peremptory instruction and do nothing more,
they thereby assume the facts to be undisputed and in effect
submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences
proper to be drawn from them. But nothing in that ruling sus-
tains the view that a party may not request a peremptory
instruction, and yet, upon the refusal of the court to give it,
insist by appropriate requests, upon the submission of the case
to the jury, where the evidence is conflicting or the inferences
to be drawn from the testimony are divirgent ....
From this it follows that the action of the trial court in
giving the peremptory instruction to return a verdict for the
railway company cannot be sustained merely because of the
request made by both parties for a peremptory instruction in
view of the special requests asked on behalf of the plaintiffs"."
The rule as laid down in the Beutell case and the Santa Fe case
has been expressly abrogated by Federal Rule 50 (a) which pro-
vides that:
"... A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is
not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the ac-
tion have moved for directed verdicts . . ." 9
The common law rule never had received universal recognition in
the state courts, among the states objecting to this doctrine are Ver-
mont, Illinois, and New Jersey. The Vermont Supreme Court in
refusing to follow it said :'1
"There is nothing novel about this practice, for the parties
in civil cases can always by agreement substitute the court for
the jury. But the mere fact that each party to a cause moves
for a verdict in his favor does not amount to a consent that the
case shall be taken from the jury. One who claims that the evi-
dence is all his way does not waive the right to claim that at
least, some of it is his way, and that right is not affected by the
fact, that the other party moves that a verdict be directed in his
favor".
7 Supra note 5.
8 Supra note 6.
9 Fed. Rule 50.
:0 Fitzsimmons v. Richardson, Twigg and Co., (1913) 86 Vt. 229, 84 Atl. 811
Accord: Woodsville, etc., Bank v. Rogers 82 Vt. 468, 74 Atl. 85; Wolf v.
Chicago Sign Printing Co. (1908) 233 Ill. 501, 84 N.E. 614; Hayes v. Kluge(1914) 86 N.J. L/657, 92 Atl. 358.11 Fitzsimmons v. Richardson, Twigg and Co., (1913) 86 Vt. 229, 84 Atl. 811.
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It seems to the writer that the reasoning of the Vermont Court
is sound. The common law rule which was reinstated in Wisconsin
by section 270.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes constitutes a trap making it
unsafe for a party to move for a directed verdict when the other party
has so moved and is a useless restriction upon the right of trial by
jury. Section 270.26 should be abrogated and Rule 50(a) of the
Federal Rules adopted in its stead. This would place Wisconsin in
the sound position that it was after the decision of our Supreme Court
in the Hite case which rejected the common law rule.3
JOHN E. AHRENS
12 Hite v. Keene (1912) 149 -W. 207, 134 N.W. 383.
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